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Abstract
This paper investigates the dynamic linkages between different types of foreign 
direct investment (FDI), domestic investment and economic growth in Vietnam. 
We decompose the aggregated FDI level into its two major components: greenfield 
investments, and cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As). The empirical 
results reveal that greenfield investments and cross-border M&As exhibit different 
impacts on economic growth. While greenfield investments appear to complement 
domestic investment, which subsequently promotes long-run economic growth, 
cross-border M&As exert a significant crowd-out effect and subsequently impede 
growth in both the short- and the long-run. These results provide important implica-
tions for policies to attract FDI in order to stimulate sustainable growth.
Keywords FDI · Greenfield investments · Cross-border M&As · Domestic 
investment · Growth · SVAR
1 Introduction
This paper investigates the dynamic linkages between different types of foreign 
direct investment (FDI), domestic investment and economic growth in Vietnam. 
The last few decades have witnessed a meteoric rise in the economy of Vietnam. 
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From an isolated nation struggling with a high poverty rate, a low living standard 
and low production levels in the post-war years, Vietnam has transformed into one 
of the fastest growing countries in the region.1 The country has now become the role 
model for many transitional and less-developed countries with low starting points 
(Thoburn 2013). This “economic miracle” owes much to the adoption of the Doi 
Moi (“Revolution”) political and economic reforms in 1986, which transformed the 
Vietnamese economic system from a centrally planned economy into a “socialist-
oriented market economy”. Accordingly, the participants in the private sector (espe-
cially foreign investors) were strongly encouraged by the government, as evidenced 
by the enactments of various deregulations and legislation changes to remove the 
burdens placed on private firms. The subsequent period witnessed a surge in FDI 
into the country. The volume of foreign investment capital was strikingly high and 
reached a peak of 17.5 billion USD in 2017. As of December 2017, there were 116 
nations and territories investing in Vietnam, including 26,746 projects with a total 
registered capital of $378.698 billion. The total newly registered and additional cap-
ital reached USD 18.76 billion during the first 10 months of 2018, an increase of 
11% in comparison with the same period in the previous year.2
Despite these impressive statistics, policymakers and economic researchers were 
still sceptical over the real economic benefit that FDI could actually bring to the 
country. A number of calls have been made for a more in-depth (i.e. Anwar and 
Nguyen 2010; Hoang et  al. 2010) investigation into the economic implications of 
FDI. Unfortunately, while the FDI-growth nexus has been a traditional topic that is 
widely examined in the economic literature, empirical investigations to quantify the 
economic impact of FDI in Vietnam are still inadequate and have never reached a 
consensus. For example, while Vu (2008) posit that FDI can bring economic gains, 
Nguyen et al. (2008) detect both negative backward and forward spillovers of FDI 
for the service sector.
Arguably, one of the reasons for the mixed evidence documented in the existing 
literature can be partly traced to the heterogeneity of FDI flows. Since the aggre-
gated FDI inflow comprises different components with divergent features, their 
economic implications may inherently be different (Calderón et al. 2004; Eren and 
Zhuang 2015). The more recent literature often separates aggregated FDI into two 
major components: greenfield investment and cross-border M&A. In principle, 
greenfield investment involves the creation of new entities through the investment 
and establishment of plants, factories and human capital. Thus, it is expected to 
exert a direct positive impact on growth by means of physical capital accumulation 
and additional production capacity (Ashraf et  al. 2016). On the other hand, since 
cross-border M&As are merely the transfer of ownership and involve the acquisition 
of existing assets, they may not lead to long-term growth (Kim 2009). Neverthe-
less, while it may seem natural to postulate that greenfield investment brings ben-
eficial impacts to the host country’s economy and M&As may not, not all empirical 
2 Ministry of Planning and Investment. Brief on foreign direct investment of 2018. (http://www.mpi.gov.
vn/en/Pages /tinba i.aspx?idTin =41941 &idcm=122).
1 The World Bank 2018. (https ://www.world bank.org/en/count ry/vietn am/overv iew).
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researches provide support for this proposition. For example, the studies by Calde-
rón et al. (2004) and Ashraf et al. (2016) both document that cross-border M&As 
can promote growth by enhancing productivity, whereas greenfield investment may 
result in a significant crowding-out effect and therefore hamper long-term growth.
Estimating the impact of different types of FDI on economic growth is an obvi-
ous challenge. Economic researches (e.g. Azman-Saini et al. 2010) have consistently 
emphasised that failure to model contingency effects in the relationship between 
FDI and growth is one of the main reasons for the mixed evidence that has been doc-
umented. A significant effort has been devoted to fostering the understanding of the 
contingent role of domestic investment in the FDI-growth nexus. The widespread 
belief is that domestic investment is an important driver of growth (Romer 1986; 
Lucas 1988; Firebaugh 1992; Fischer 1993). Recent empirical studies (i.e. Abu and 
Karim 2016; Omri and Kahouli 2014; Ahmad et al. 2018) also provide support for 
this proposition. In this regard, if FDI promotes (displaces) domestic investment, it 
may (not) be beneficial in the long run. However, the empirical evidence on how 
FDI affects domestic investment has again been mixed. For instance, while the study 
by Mutenyo and Asmah (2010) shows that domestic investment is negatively associ-
ated with FDI, Ndikumana and Verick (2008) and Tang et al. (2008) find that FDI 
complements domestic investment.
Research has been conducted on the relationships between FDI, domestic invest-
ment and economic growth for a long time under the assumption that FDI inflows 
are largely homogeneous entities. In this paper, we argue that, since FDI contains 
very different components, ignoring the heterogenous characteristics of different 
types of FDI will lead to material oversight. Until recently, only a handful of stud-
ies (i.e. Calderón et  al. 2004; Balsvik and Haller 2010; Ashraf et  al. 2016; Chen 
et al. 2017) have started to evaluate the impact of different types of FDI on domestic 
investments. They find that each type of FDI would impact domestic investments 
differently. Until now, whether and to what extent FDI can affect economic growth 
still remains an open empirical question.
In this paper, we attempt to close this gap in the literature and examine the 
dynamic relationship between different types of FDI, domestic investment and eco-
nomic growth. We focus particularly on greenfield investment and cross-border 
M&As when assessing FDI inflows because they are the two main types of FDI, and 
they compose a major portion of total FDI inflow in many developed and develop-
ing countries (Calderón et al. 2004). The United Nations also documents that total 
inward FDI can be measured approximately by the sum of cross-border M&As and 
greenfield investment (UNCTAD 2000).
We investigate the relationship between greenfield investment, cross-border 
M&As, domestic investment and economic growth in Vietnam. Vietnam emerged 
as a unique and ideal setting for the investigation of the growth impact of different 
types of FDI, both due to the sparsity of studies on the country and also due to the 
unique institutional system where the communist party—albeit the only party to rule 
the country—have still been introducing a number of regulatory reforms to liberalise 
the market and attract more foreign capital. Under the regulatory perspective, FDI 
could facilitate Vietnam’s economy through direct capital formation. However, there 
are also increasing concerns that FDI may displace domestic investment and thus 
 Economic Change and Restructuring
1 3
dampen growth in the country (Hoang et al. 2010). Collectively, whether Vietnam 
should either devote policy incentives for attracting more foreign capital, or whether 
it should give priority to promoting the domestic counterpart is an empirical ques-
tion of crucial importance.
Using macroeconomic data in Vietnam over the period from 2003 to 2017, we 
find that cross-border M&As and greenfield investments exhibit different impacts 
on domestic investment and economic growth. Specifically, we find that green-
field investments strengthen both domestic investment and growth in Vietnam. On 
the other hand, cross-border M&As appear to constrain domestic investment and 
dampen growth in both the short- and the long-run. Therefore, the empirical find-
ings present some implications for policymakers in Vietnam towards fostering eco-
nomic growth through the development of different FDI modes of entry.
Our paper is different from other researches and thus contributes to the extant 
literature in a number of ways. Firstly, while many studies have examined the impact 
of different types of FDI on growth across countries (i.e. Ashraf and Herzer 2014), 
significantly less attention has been devoted to understanding the growth impact of 
FDI in the context of a single nation, especially in a country that is experiencing 
an ongoing restructuring of its political–economic environment. However, a sin-
gle-country study is needed because of the heterogeneous characteristics of FDI as 
well as the various social-economic conditions across nations, which could impose 
significant constraints on the breadth and accuracy of the empirical results. In this 
context, and by using a rigorous empirical approach in a single-country setting, we 
contribute to the broad literature on the growth impact of FDI by providing a more 
creditable empirical result and inference. Secondly, by separately examining the 
impact of greenfield investment and cross-border M&As on domestic investment, 
we contribute to the emerging strand of the literature that investigates the impact of 
different types of FDI on domestic investment (i.e. Balsvik and Haller 2010; Ashraf 
and Herzer 2014; Ashraf et  al. 2016; Chen et  al. 2017). We also go beyond this 
strand and show the results of how different types of FDI affect domestic investment 
and subsequently affect growth. More importantly, to the best of our knowledge, our 
study is the first to partition the total FDI and evaluate their corresponding impacts 
on domestic investment and economic growth in Vietnam.
The rest of this study is organised as follows: Sect. 2 discusses the relevant litera-
ture, Sect. 3 presents the data and model specification used in our analysis, and the 
empirical results are presented in Sects. 4 and 5 concludes.
2  Literature review
2.1  The impact of FDI on economic growth
The linkage between FDI and economic growth has often been a controversial topic. 
In the theoretical neoclassical growth model, FDI is illustrated as promoting growth 
through the accumulation of capital (Solow 1956). In this regard, FDI is expected 
to be more stable and less vulnerable to reversals than other types of capital flow 
(Levchenko and Mauro 2007; Tong and Wei 2011). Subsequently, the endogenous 
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growth model demonstrates that FDI can facilitate growth, both directly by accumu-
lating capital formation and indirectly through technological diffusion and knowl-
edge spillovers (Caves 1974; De Mello Jr 1997; Grossman and Helpman 1991). 
Rodriguez-Clare (1996) provides support to this proposition and asserts that, when 
domestic firms absorb advanced technology and management know-how transmitted 
from multinational companies, their productivity increases and the host country’s 
economy would benefit from such enhancements. Subsequently, Smarzynska Javor-
cik (2004) also confirm a pivotal role of FDI in promoting the positive spillover 
effect, such as the diffusion of ideas and the transfer of technology stemming from 
the interaction of foreign firms with the local economy. Research (i.e. Blomström 
1991; Ashraf et al. 2016) further shows that FDI may create a necessarily competi-
tive market that forces domestic competitors to adopt more innovative technologies 
and/or operate in a more efficient manner. This, in turn, could significantly con-
tribute to economic growth. More recent empirical studies (i.e. Gunby et al. 2017; 
Hayat 2018) also show the evidence that FDI exerts a significant and positive impact 
on the economic growth of recipient countries.
Nevertheless, many other economic researchers postulate that FDI has no growth 
effect or could even negatively influence the economy (i.e. Driffield and Hughes 
2003; Farla et  al. 2016). For example, Herzer and Klasen (2008) suggest that the 
positive technological and knowledge spillovers proposed by the endogenous growth 
model may not exist in developing countries. This is because domestic firms may 
lack the capacity to absorb and apply the superior skills, knowledge, and advanced 
materials brought by foreign counterparts. In line with this proposition, Görg and 
Greenaway (2004) find no robust evidence to support the existence of spillovers in 
developing countries. Similarly, Durham (2004) does not find any direct and unmiti-
gated positive FDI-growth nexus and argues that the impacts of FDI are contingent 
upon the absorptive capability of the host nation. Alfaro et  al. (2004) assert that 
the effects of FDI on growth are contingent upon the development of the financial 
market. More recently, Makiela and Ouattara (2018) examine the transmission chan-
nels from FDI to growth and report a mixed evidence. Notably, they illustrate that 
FDI does not impact on growth through the total factor productivity enhancement 
channel. Even in the case where inward FDI appears to improve the overall growth 
potential of the host economy, this growth could be generated primarily through pro-
ductivity enhancements within the foreign entities themselves, rather than through 
capital investment or technology and knowledge spillovers (Navaretti et  al. 2006; 
Desbordes and Franssen 2019). Aitken and Harrison (1999) eventually show that 
FDI could hamper the economy in developing nations if it crowds out domestic 
investment. This could be a particular issue for countries that are heavily reliant on 
assistance from other nations, where FDI might create monopolies in the industrial 
sector, displacing domestic enterprises and consequently hampering the economy 
(Adams 2009).
A very limited number of empirical studies have been conducted on the relation-
ship between FDI and economic growth in Vietnam. Vu et al. (2008), using sectoral 
data for FDI inflows into China and Vietnam from 1990 to 2004, claim that FDI has 
a positive impact on economic growth in both countries. Subsequently, Hoang et al. 
(2010) show that FDI contributes significantly to the country’s stock of capital and 
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thus positively impacts Vietnamese economic growth. However, when examining 
the interactions of FDI with domestic investment, they document a negative rela-
tionship. In other words, FDI appears to crowd out domestic investment, thus caus-
ing a reduction in Vietnam’s economic growth. Subsequently, Nguyen et al. (2008) 
study the impacts of FDI on the technical efficiency of domestic firms and reveal 
that FDI does not always create positive spillovers to the technical efficiency of local 
enterprises. More recently, Anwar and Nguyen (2010) tested the two-way linkage 
between FDI and growth using a simultaneous equation model and document suf-
ficient evidence that FDI has a direct positive and significant impact on economic 
growth. However, when analysing the interaction of FDI with domestic investment, 
they find similar results to those suggested by Hoang et al. (2010) in that, as far as 
domestic investment is concerned, Vietnam has not reached the minimum threshold 
required to gain benefits from FDI capital.
2.2  Greenfield investment, domestic investment and economic growth
Greenfield investment can exert a significant impact on the host country’s economic 
growth in a number of ways. Firstly, since greenfield investment involves building 
everything from scratch, it can make notable contributions to capital stock for pro-
duction, which is an important driver of growth. Secondly, greenfield investments 
could also lead to growth through the facilitation of job markets and increased 
competition (UNCTAD 2000). Owing to these new setting-up facilities, green-
field investment can both create new employment opportunities and also increase 
the number of firms in existence, thus lowering the barrier to entry. In this con-
text, greenfield investment can be extra beneficial to the host country’s economy 
since it could give rise to the presence of productive foreign firms and thus result 
in higher productivity gains. Liu and Zou (2008) examine the impact of greenfield 
investments on domestic firms’ innovation and find that greenfield investment exerts 
a positive impact on innovation through both intra- and inter-industry R&D invest-
ment. Consistent with those conjectures, Wang and Wong (2009) find that greenfield 
investments have a significant positive impact on economic growth in both devel-
oped and developing countries. More recently, Harms and Méon (2018) emphasise 
that greenfield investment has a significantly positive effect on economic growth as 
an entry of foreign firms in the way that greenfield investment would give rise to 
aggregated productivity by expanding the host country’s stock of capital.
Nevertheless, some other studies find no significant, or even a negative, link-
age between greenfield investment and economic growth, suggesting that green-
field investment does not necessarily foster economic growth in the host country. 
For example, Calderón et al. (2004) document that greenfield investment does not 
lead to economic growth. In a similar vein, Eren and Zhuang (2015) suggest that 
greenfield investment causes negative growth effects of the economy in the short run 
and only stimulates economic growth when the level of absorptive capability in the 
host country reaches a certain threshold. In this regard, the growth impacts of green-
field investment are contingent upon the availability of the host countries’ absorptive 
capacities. In line with this proposition, some other studies propose that greenfield 
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investment can lead to a significant crowding-out effect and therefore damage 
long-term growth. For instance, Jude (2018) empirically explores the relationship 
between greenfield investment and domestic investment and finds some evidence 
that greenfield investment exhibits a significant crowding-out effect on capital accu-
mulation. This negative impact stems from the intensified competitive market where 
foreign firms, often being more superior than their domestic counterparts (Aitken 
and Harrison 1999), capturing market demand and then forcing domestic firms out 
of businesses. Similarly, Balsvik and Haller (2010) also argue that the crowding-out 
effects of greenfield investments may be due to the increased competition in both 
the product market and the labour market for qualified employees. Using panel data 
for 100 developing countries over the period from 2003 to 2011, Ashraf and Herzer 
(2014) document a similar finding that greenfield investment has a large crowding-
out effect. More recently, Chen et al. (2017) further posit that the negative effects 
of greenfield investment on domestic investment may be attributable to the market-
seeking greenfield established firms that displace their domestic competitors.
2.3  Cross‑border M&As, domestic investment and economic growth
The impact of cross-border M&As on economic growth is also controversial in 
the economic literature. The first strand of the literature proposes that cross-bor-
der M&As can crowd out domestic investment and subsequently hinder economic 
growth. One of the main reasons for this is that the presence of more foreign capital 
in the form of cross-border M&As could lead to a significant, competitive pressure 
being placed on domestic firms. By acquiring domestic companies, foreign inves-
tors can benefit largely from the integration and the exchange of valuable resources 
and knowledge (i.e. scarce domestic resources and valuable local knowledge) that 
could grant them a fast market entry and certain competitive advantages. In these 
circumstances, domestic firms may not be able to compete with those foreign com-
petitors and can eventually be forced out of business. Consistent with these proposi-
tions, Ashraf and Herzer (2014) find no evidence to suggest that M&As can facili-
tate domestic investment. These findings have led recent researchers to cast doubt 
on the growth impact of cross-border M&As. For example, Harms and Méon (2018) 
document that M&As have no significant effect on growth, while Eren and Zhuang 
(2015) find that M&As only exert positive effects on economic growth under a 
developed financial system.
By contrast, another strand of the literature (i.e. Danakol et al. 2017) documents 
the possibility that cross-border M&As can facilitate domestic investment, improve 
productivity, and subsequently, facilitate economic growth. For example, Blom-
ström and Sjöholm (1999) suggest that domestic firms can gain benefits from spillo-
vers stemming from cross-border M&As. Arguably, the presence of more foreign 
acquirers with superior technologies and skills may lead to a significant increase 
in industry competition that forces domestic firms to be more efficient. Calderón 
et al. (2004) also find that M&As lead to the crowding-in of domestic investment. 
Jude (2018) documents further that, if the host country has developed financial mar-
kets (i.e. a strong banking sector), it is likely that M&As will lead to crowding-in 
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effects on domestic investment. Balsvik and Haller (2010) investigate the impact of 
M&As on the productivity of domestic plants and contend that cross-border M&As 
are positively associated with domestic plants’ productivity, which may be due to 
the knowledge spillovers driven by pre-established linkages between these plants. 
Similarly, Ashraf et al. (2016) document a positive effect of M&As on total factor 
productivity, which could arguably lead to economic growth.
3  Data and methodology
This section introduces the model specification in our empirical analysis. It also dis-
cusses the variables used in this study along with their sources.
3.1  The Specification of the SVAR model
In this paper, we employ the structural vector auto-regression (SVAR) model to 
study the dynamics of cross-border M&As, greenfield investment, domestic invest-
ment and economic growth. Although the traditional vector auto-regression (VAR) 
model has been employed in a number of studies using time-series data, this meth-
odology is inadequate to investigate the multivariate contemporaneous linkages 
between variables (Zeng et  al. 2017). The SVAR model, on the other hand, can 
address this limitation by adding the current values of endogenous variables on the 
right-hand side of simultaneous equations (Zeng et al. 2017). In addition, the SVAR 
model can also explain the evolution of the series and analyse the dynamic impacts 
of different disturbances on variables. Collectively, the SVAR model appears to be 
the more desirable methodology to study multivariate relationships between vari-
ables in the study.
As the SVAR model requires restrictions (Magkonis and Tsopanakis 2014), in 
this paper, we constrain contemporaneous structural shocks by employing the recur-
sive identification system through the Cholesky decomposition. The SVAR model is 
taken to be the form:
where n is the maximum lag length and x
t
 denotes a (4 × 4) vector of endogenous 
variables. In this study, we specify an SVAR model with the following four vari-
ables: M&A, greenfield investments, domestic investments and economic growth. 
The definitions and summarised statistics of the above variables will be discussed 
in the subsequent section. To this end, the natural logarithms of these variables, 
which are denoted as M&A, greenfield investments, domestic investments and GDP, 
respectively, will be employed in the empirical model. A is a (4 × 4) matrix of coef-
ficients of simultaneous relationships of the endogenous variables, c0 is the con-
stant, Ai is the matrix of autoregressive coefficients, xt−i is a (4 × 1) vector of lagged 
values of endogenous variables and 휀
t
 is a (4 × 1) vector of uncorrelated structural 
innovations.
(1)Axt = c0 +
n∑
i=1
A
i
x
t−i
+ B휀
t
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One problem is that it is impossible to estimate the real values of components 
in A and Ai directly when analysing the structural model. To solve this, we follow 
the literature (Lee and Yue 2017) and obtain the reduced-form VAR by multiplying 
Eq. (1) by A−1, which demonstrates each endogenous variable as a function of pre-
determined variables:
where 휎
i
 is a (4 × 4) matrix of coefficients, 휎
i
= A
−1
A
i
,휇
t
 is (4 × 1) vector of error 
terms in reduced-form VAR and 휇
t
= A
−1
B휀
t
.
Given that matrix A is a lower unit triangular matrix and matrix B is a diagonal 
matrix, they are taken to be the following forms:
As noted earlier, the order of variables will need to be specified based on relevant 
economic theories and consumption since the contemporaneous response of a vari-
able to a shock of endogenous variables in this model depends highly on this order.
In the first instance, we assume that M&A is the most exogenous variable in the 
model and that it is likely to exert impacts on the other variables, but that it will not 
be affected by other endogenous variables in the model. Following the literature, we 
assume that M&A could affect greenfield investments, as verified by Calderón et al. 
(2004), who proved that higher M&As are followed by higher greenfield invest-
ments. M&A and greenfield investments are therefore placed in the two first rows in 
the matrix.
Secondly, M&A and greenfield investments would possibly crowd in or crowd 
out the domestic investments (Agosin and Machado 2005). This means that M&A 
and greenfield investments could exert impacts on domestic investments and the 
response of domestic investments could either be negative or positive. Thus, domes-
tic investments are placed in the third row.
Finally, in the last row of the matrix, we assume that economic growth responds 
contemporaneously to all shocks, although it has no contemporaneous effect on 
other variables. The conventional theory about the impact of foreign investment on 
growth (i.e. Solow 1956) paved the way for this assumption. In addition, domestic 
investment is a part of gross domestic product (GDP) and, therefore, affects eco-
nomic growth. As such, and based on our assumptions, GDP seemed to be the least 
exogenous variable and it was placed in the last row of the matrix.3
x
t
=
n∑
i=1
휎
i
x
t−i
+ 휇
t
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎣
1 0 0 0
a21 1 0 0
a31 a32 1 0
a41 a42 a43 1
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎦
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎣
휇
M&A
t
휇
Greenfield Invesments
t
휇
Domestic Investments
t
휇
GDP
t
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎦
=
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎣
b11 0 0 0
0 b22 0 0
0 0 b33 0
0 0 0 b44
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎦
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎣
휀
M&A
t
휀
Greenfield Investments
t
휀
Domestic Investments
t
휀
GDP
t
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎦
3 To ensure the robustness of our empirical results, we conduct a robustness test in which the order of 
variables is changed. Specifically, the order of variables is now set as follows: GDP → GFCF → MA → 
GF. More information about the robustness test and its result is provided in Appendix A. Overall, the 
results are predominantly in line with the baseline results.
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3.2  Data
The focal point of this study is investigating the effects of greenfield investments and 
M&As on both domestic investment and growth in Vietnam. Data on cross-border 
M&As and greenfield investments are retrieved from UNCTAD’s World Investment 
Report. Unfortunately, the available information on cross-border M&A transactions and 
greenfield investments is limited prior to 1987 and 2003, respectively, while some ear-
lier FDI entry mode studies (i.e. Calderón et al. 2004; Wang and Wong 2009; Eren and 
Zhuang 2015; Harms and Méon 2018) have simply calculated greenfield investments 
by subtracting M&As from total FDI inflows that measurement of greenfield invest-
ment would not be a perfect proxy (i.e. correctly reflecting the actual value), because 
FDI inflow is an aggregation of both greenfield investment and M&As, and also other 
similar capital transfer activities, such as reinvestments and disinvestments undertaken 
by multinational enterprises (MNEs). As a result, we do not use the self-constructed 
greenfield numbers, which are equal to the difference between FDI inflows and M&As, 
during the missing period (from 1987 to 2002) because it can be an imperfect proxy. 
We therefore restrict the time window in our study to the 2003-to-2017 period, where 
data for both greenfield investments and M&As are available.
With regard to the other variables, real GDP calculated at the constant 2010 US$ 
price represents economic growth and it is drawn from the World Development Indica-
tor provided by the World Bank. Domestic investment is measured by gross fixed capi-
tal formation, which is obtained from the General Statistics Office of Vietnam. It refers 
to expenditure for the investment in fixed assets, changes in inventories and precious 
items in a given period.
To span the series data, we follow the literature (i.e. Marcellino and Musso 2011; 
Grossman et al. 2014) and convert the annual data on M&As, greenfield investments, 
domestic investment and economic growth into quarterly data using the quadratic 
match average method. Data are also transformed into logarithmic and differential 
forms to avoid possible heteroscedasticity and multicollinearity (Xu and Lin 2016).
4  Empirical results
This section evaluates the impacts of cross-border M&As and greenfield investment on 
domestic investment and ultimately economic growth. Prior to that, a series of specifi-
cation tests are conducted to ensure a well-specified model, and these include the sta-
tionary test, a co-integration test and lag length selection.
4.1  Specification tests
4.1.1  Testing for stationary
One problem that may be encountered with any time-series model is that the series 
data may be non-stationary. If this occurs, the regressions of non-stationary vari-
ables against other unrelated non-stationary variables in the model may lead to the 
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spurious results (Phillips 1986). Following the literature, we use the standard unit 
root test to check the stationarity of the time series.
Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF), Phillips Perron (PP) and Kwiatkowski Phillips 
Schmidt Shin (KPSS) are the three most common techniques for unit root testing. 
The ADF has been used widely in empirical studies, but this procedure incorpo-
rates auto-correlated and heteroscedastic non-systematic components, making the 
test vulnerable to inappropriate lag length specification (Hall 1994). In addition, 
the test may also lead to the biased results when time series contain a time trend 
(Xu and Lin 2016). The PP test, on the other hand, has advantages over the ADF 
tests by nonparametrically modifying the Dickey Fuller test statistics to allow for 
a very wide class of time-series models in which there is a unit root (Phillips and 
Perron 1988), and this makes the results robust to any serial correlation and het-
eroscedasticity (Chan et al. 1992). Consequently, the asymptotic distribution of the 
test statistic is not affected by the serial correlation, and the results do not depend 
on lag length selection either. However, both ADF and PP approaches may present 
bias towards the existence of unit roots in small-sample data such as ours (Gomez-
Biscarri and Hualde 2015). In this context, KPSS appears to be a more appropriate 
method, as it is able to compensate for this limitation, as well as directly testing the 
null hypothesis of stationarity against the alternative of a unit root that ADF and PP 
attempt to check (Ajayi and Mougouė 1996). To this end, all three tests are used to 
ensure the credibility of the model.
The test results are shown in Table 1. All variables are stationary at both level and 
first difference in the KPSS test, and they are stationary at first difference in the ADF 
and PP tests. To this end, although the tests do not indicate the identical results, all 
of the series can still be considered as stationary at first difference. Therefore, the 
precondition of the unit root test is met in order to proceed to the co-integration test.
Following the standard procedure in the previous literature, in the next step, 
we conduct the AR root test to check the stability of the SVAR model. This step 
is necessary because the model misspecification or parameter non-constancy may 
exert adverse consequences on statistical inferences and lead to misleading results 
(Xu and Lin 2016). Figure 1 shows that all characteristic roots are in the unit circle, 
meaning that the model is stable, and the result derived from the model is valid with 
the set of four variables.
4.1.2  Testing for co‑integration
As economic series often experience stochastic trends or are non-stationary in their 
properties, the optimal way to reduce trends and avoid spurious regressions is to 
check for co-integration, which implies long-term relationships between variables. 
The reason for is that, when non-stationary variables are co-integrated, they will link 
together strongly and will not wander too far apart from each other, even when they 
have different stochastic trends (Phillips 1986). Following the literature, we conduct 
the commonly used Johansen approach to test for co-integration. In Table 2, both 
the trace test and the eigenvalue test indicate one vector of co-integration. Thus, it 
appears that there are long-term relationships between the variables in the study.
 Economic Change and Restructuring
1 3
Ta
bl
e 
1 
 U
ni
t r
oo
t t
es
t
Th
is 
tab
le 
pr
ov
id
es
 th
e r
es
ul
ts 
of
 th
re
e s
tat
io
na
ry
 te
sts
: A
DF
, P
P, 
an
d 
KP
SS
. A
ll 
va
ria
bl
es
 ar
e t
es
ted
 fo
r u
ni
t r
oo
t i
n 
lev
el 
an
d 
fir
st 
di
ffe
re
nc
e. 
Th
e t
es
ts 
in
clu
de
 ei
th
er
 an
 
in
ter
ce
pt
, o
r b
ot
h 
th
e t
re
nd
 an
d 
in
ter
ce
pt
 in
 th
e t
es
t e
qu
ati
on
. I
n 
th
e A
DF
 an
d 
PP
 te
st,
 *
**
, *
*, 
an
d 
* 
in
di
ca
te 
th
at 
th
e n
ul
l h
yp
ot
he
sis
, w
he
re
 th
e s
er
ies
 h
as
 a 
un
it 
ro
ot
, w
as
 
re
jec
ted
 at
 a 
sig
ni
fic
an
ce
 o
f 1
%,
 5
%,
 1
0%
, r
es
pe
cti
ve
ly.
 In
 th
e K
PS
S 
tes
t, 
**
*, 
**
, a
nd
 *
 in
di
ca
te 
th
at 
th
e n
ul
l h
yp
ot
he
sis
, w
he
re
 th
e s
er
ies
 is
 st
ati
on
ar
y, 
wa
s n
ot
 re
jec
ted
 at
 
th
e s
ig
ni
fic
an
ce
 of
 10
%,
 5%
, 1
%,
 re
sp
ec
tiv
ely
Va
ria
bl
es
AD
F
PP
KP
SS
In
ter
ce
pt
In
ter
ce
pt
 an
d T
re
nd
In
ter
ce
pt
In
ter
ce
pt
 an
d T
re
nd
In
ter
ce
pt
In
ter
ce
pt
 an
d T
re
nd
Le
ve
l
M
&
A
− 
3.9
81
**
*
− 
3.6
02
**
− 
4.0
28
**
*
− 
4.2
66
**
*
0.6
73
**
*
0.1
30
**
*
Gr
ee
nfi
eld
 in
ve
stm
en
ts
− 
3.2
60
**
− 
3.0
08
− 
1.9
29
− 
1.7
70
0.1
44
**
*
0.0
85
**
*
Do
m
es
tic
 in
ve
stm
en
ts
− 
1.7
20
− 
2.7
76
− 
1.8
57
− 
1.8
25
0.5
81
**
*
0.1
38
**
*
GD
P
− 
0.2
82
− 
2.6
31
− 
1.6
27
− 
2.8
05
0.9
68
0.1
76
**
*
Fi
rst
 di
ffe
re
nc
e
M
&
A
− 
6.7
48
**
*
− 
6.7
01
**
*
− 
8.0
53
**
*
− 
7.8
58
**
*
0.1
48
**
*
0.0
47
**
*
Gr
ee
nfi
eld
 in
ve
stm
en
ts
− 
0.7
69
− 
0.9
16
− 
2.3
77
− 
2.5
45
0.1
15
**
*
0.0
72
**
*
Do
m
es
tic
 in
ve
stm
en
ts
− 
1.4
30
− 
1.2
88
− 
3.7
14
**
*
− 
3.6
78
**
0.1
58
**
*
0.1
33
**
*
GD
P
− 
2.5
00
− 
2.3
39
− 
2.4
33
− 
2.2
74
0.3
65
**
*
0.2
05
**
*
1 3
Economic Change and Restructuring 
4.1.3  Lag length selection
According to Xu and Lin (2016), the inappropriate selection of lag structures can 
lead to an inefficient model. Specifically, if the lag period is too short, the data gen-
erating process will not be represented correctly, whereas if the lag period is too 
large, the model will face the problem of lacking degrees of freedom and the estima-
tion will be unreliable (Song and Witt 2006). Thus, in order to ensure the appropri-
ateness of the econometric models, and hence the empirical results, we follow the 
standard procedure in the literature (i.e. Xu and Lin 2016) and choose a lag of 2, 
as indicated by the sequential modified LR test statistic (LR), final prediction error 
Fig. 1  Inverse roots of the 
characteristic AR polynomial. 
Note: This figure represents the 
inverse roots of the character-
istic AR polynomial, which are 
indicated using blue dots
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
-1.5 -1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5
Table 2  Johansen co-integration test
This table provides the results of the trace test and the Max-eigenvalue test. Both indicate 1 co-integrat-
ing equation at the 0.05 level
*Rejection of the hypothesis at the 5% significant level
**Mackinnon–Haug–Michelis (1999) p values
Hypothesised no. of 
CE(s)
Eigenvalue Trace statistic 0.05 Critical value Prob.**
None* 0.4206 53.0904 47.8561 0.0149
At most 1 0.2155 21.9848 29.7971 0.2993
At most 2 0.1325 8.1492 15.4947 0.4496
At most 3 0.0008 0.0457 3.8415 0.8307
Hypothesised No. 
of CE(s)
Eigenvalue Max-Eigen statistic 0.05 Critical value Prob.**
None* 0.4206 31.1056 27.5843 0.0169
At most 1 0.2155 13.8356 21.1316 0.3787
At most 2 0.1325 8.1035 14.2646 0.3683
At most 3 0.0008 0.0457 3.8415 0.8307
 Economic Change and Restructuring
1 3
(FPE), Akaike information criterion (AIC), Schwarz information criterion (SC) and 
Hannan–Quinn information criterion (HQ) in Table 3.
4.2  Impulse response function
In this paper, we employ the impulse response function to analyse the empirical 
reaction of each endogenous variable in response to a standard deviation of different 
variables. This methodology is advantageous both for illustrating the dynamic link-
ages between the variables and also for identifying the shocks and measuring their 
effects on endogenous variables. The empirical results are reported in Fig. 2.
Figure 2a illustrates how domestic investment responds to a shock to cross-border 
M&As. As demonstrated in this figure, domestic investment generally displays a 
negative response to M&A shocks. Specifically, after continuously dropping steeply 
during the first half of each period, the impulse response of M&A remains negative 
in both the mid- and the long-run. This indicates that cross-border M&As generally 
hamper domestic investment. One potential explanation is that M&As are only the 
transformation of the ownership of existing businesses, so they have almost no sig-
nificant effect on domestic investment. This is consistent with the suggestion made 
by Agosin and Machado (2005) that foreign investment exerts no positive impact 
on domestic investment in developing countries. In the longer term, cross-border 
M&As could lead to a sharp decrease in domestic investments as it could create 
higher entry barriers to domestic entrepreneurs and reduce their investment incen-
tives (Danakol et al. 2017).
Panel 2B how domestic investment reacts spontaneously to a change of one 
standard deviation of greenfield investments. As demonstrated in Fig.  2b, green-
field investment facilitates domestic investment in Vietnam over time. This can be 
explained by the fact that the presence of foreign firms with superior technology 
and know-how may create positive spillover effects that are beneficial for domes-
tic firms (Mileva 2008). Another explanation for the positive effect of greenfield 
investment on domestic investment is that the huge flow of greenfield investment 
into the host countries may also give rise to loanable funds, removing the finan-
cial constraints that domestic firms are facing and encouraging them to spend more 
on investments (Harrison et al. 2004). Empirically, this positive correlation between 
Table 3  Lag selection criteria
This table contains the results of the lag length selection tests based on the following criteria: LR—
sequential modified LR test statistic (each test is at the 5% level); FPE—final prediction error; AIC—
Akaike information criterion; SC—Schwarz information criterion; HQ—Hannan–Quinn information 
criterion
*Lag order selected by criterion
Lag Log L LR FPE AIC SC HQ
0 − 50.4862 NA 7.69e−05 1.878834 2.020933 1.934184
1 402.5475 827.9580 2.20e−11 − 13.19129 − 12.48079 − 12.91454
2 462.8977 101.9712* 4.80e−12* − 14.72061* − 13.44172* − 14.22246*
1 3
Economic Change and Restructuring 
inward foreign capital and domestic investment is also demonstrated in the study of 
Al-Sadig (2013).
Figure  2c provides an assessment of the response of economic growth to a 
structural shock of domestic investment. It is evident from this figure that domes-
tic investments generate a positive effect on economic growth, which is shown by 
the positive response of economic growth to a shock to domestic investment mostly 
throughout the whole period. This result is consistent with the common perception 
that domestic investment can enhance economic growth via its direct contribution to 
the sum of a country’s GDP.
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Fig. 2  Response of GDP and domestic investments to a shock to M&A and greenfield investments. Note: 
The solid lines define the mean responses to one standard deviation, and the dotted lines represent ± 2 
standard deviations of these responses
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Figure 2b uncovers the impact of a shock to M&As on greenfield investment. As 
is being demonstrated in this figure, M&A exerts a positive impact on greenfield 
investment. This impact is more pronounced in the first few years before becoming 
less obvious in the mid- and long-term. Overall, this result is consistent with the 
finding of Calderón et al. (2004) that M&A leads to more greenfield investments in 
developing countries.
Figure  2e depicts the response of economic growth to a shock to cross-border 
M&As. As can be seen in the figure, economic growth generally reacts negatively 
to a one standard deviation shock to M&As, especially in the mid- and long-term. 
This finding illustrates that the Vietnamese economy may not benefit from attracting 
more foreign capital in the form of cross-border M&As. Overall, this is also con-
sistent with the existing literature, which criticises M&As for just being speculative 
funds, seeking only the arbitrage profits with no value-adding contribution (i.e. Kim 
2009). Therefore, they may not enhance the productivity of the host country.
Figure 2f describes how a structural shock of greenfield investment affects eco-
nomic growth. In contrast to the effect shown in Fig. 2f, greenfield investments exert 
a positive effect on economic growth, especially in the long term. While the impact 
of greenfield investments on the economy is not quite clear in the first few years, 
the positive effect becomes more prominent in the subsequent period. A plausible 
explanation for this may be that since greenfield investments involve building every-
thing from scratch, it may take a certain period of time for foreign investors to set-
tle their business and start operating. Thus, the economic gains may not be realised 
immediately. As time passes, the host country can benefit from the contribution to 
fixed capital formation, enhancing employment and human resources, as well as the 
manufacturing exports from greenfield investors (i.e. Mencinger 2003).
Collectively, the estimated results illustrate that M&As and greenfield invest-
ments have different impacts on domestic investment and economic growth in Viet-
nam. The findings of the study are largely consistent with the existing literature, 
which states that M&As might be less beneficial than greenfield investments (Harms 
and Méon 2018; Wang and Wong 2009).
4.3  Variance decomposition
The variance decomposition shows how much of the forecast error variance of each 
variable can be explained by the shocks of other variables in the model. The vari-
ance decomposition for the twenty periods is selected to represent the short-term 
and long-term effects, as shown in Table 4. As can be seen from the table, during the 
changes in growth, its own effect is 81.5% in the first period, but this then fluctuates 
over time. The GDP effect finally reaches approximately 86.8% in the last quarter. 
Subsequently, M&A shocks are the second major contributor explaining GDP’s var-
iance. In the first year, they account for around 1.2% of the forecast error variance 
on average, although they increase to 17.1% in the long run. Domestic investment 
shock ranks third in its relative contribution. This impulse constitutes about 17% 
in the short-term, but decreases considerably before standing at just over 4.6% in 
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the long-term. Racing with domestic investments is greenfield investments, which 
account for approximately 3.4% of the long-term fluctuation in GDP.
Although there is a steady drop in the contributed proportion, the changes in 
domestic investment are predominantly explained by themselves during the esti-
mated period (Table 5). Specifically, it falls sharply from roughly 98% in the short 
run to around 28% in the long run. Greenfield investment shares the second largest 
part of the forecast error variance in domestic investment, followed by GDP shock 
in the third place. M&As explain around 2% of the variation in both the short- and 
the long-term. While the influence of greenfield investments contributes to the fore-
cast error variance in domestic investment significantly, the other entry mode of 
FDI does not give a remarkably explanatory power to the fluctuation in domestic 
investment.
The corresponding importance of the different driving forces of M&A can be 
assessed by investigating the decomposition of their forecast error variance, as illus-
trated in Table 6. M&A itself explains 100% of its own forecast error variance in the 
short run, but this effect decreases gradually and hits 78% in the last period, remain-
ing the most crucial factor. Next, shock to greenfield investments ranks second and 
Table 4  Variance decomposition of GDP
This table represents the percentage of the forecast error variance of GDP, as explained by the other vari-
ables over 20 periods
Period S.E. M&A Greenfield 
investments
Domestic investment GDP
1 0.001169 1.200616 0.222297 17.1035 81.47359
2 0.002302 0.320641 0.062437 17.17757 82.43935
3 0.003465 0.747777 0.095739 15.7679 83.38859
4 0.004634 2.146197 0.105859 13.58172 84.16623
5 0.005786 3.730247 0.071917 11.21552 84.98231
6 0.0069 5.015578 0.079954 9.031944 85.87252
7 0.007959 5.874103 0.241621 7.199063 86.68521
8 0.00896 6.358709 0.629091 5.767825 87.24437
9 0.0099 6.571279 1.241 4.725115 87.46261
10 0.010778 6.6056 2.004582 4.024939 87.36488
11 0.011597 6.532299 2.80462 3.60792 87.05516
12 0.012355 6.399704 3.521315 3.413436 86.66555
13 0.013056 6.238659 4.061654 3.386001 86.31369
14 0.013705 6.067295 4.37701 3.477473 86.07822
15 0.014309 5.894941 4.46666 3.646897 85.9915
16 0.014881 5.725269 4.370224 3.859596 86.04491
17 0.015433 5.558855 4.152865 4.08653 86.20175
18 0.015978 5.395209 3.887266 4.304294 86.41323
19 0.016527 5.234205 3.636622 4.495597 86.63358
20 0.017088 5.076823 3.442628 4.649699 86.83085
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causes roughly 9.1% fluctuation in M&A. GDP and investment explain around 8% 
and 5% of the variation in M&A, respectively.
As demonstrated in Table 7, GDP is the second most important variable explain-
ing greenfield investments’ forecast error variance following greenfield investment 
itself. GDP makes up 0% of the variability in the first quarter. Throughout the 
period, moderate increases to 21% are recorded in the contribution from GDP to 
greenfield investments’ variance. Both innovation in domestic investment and M&A 
have little influence on the fluctuation of greenfield investments in the short run as 
well as in the long run, as it stays at around 1%.
5  Conclusion
What is the impact of FDI on economic growth? Why do some studies suggest 
that FDI is an important element that fosters economic growth, whereas others 
document a negative FDI-growth nexus, thus suggesting that policies to promote 
domestic investment over foreign capital are necessary? This paper attempts to 
Table 5  Variance decomposition of domestic investments
This table represents the percentage of the forecast error variance of domestic investments, as explained 
by the other variables over 20 periods
Period S.E. M&A Greenfield 
investments
Domestic investments GDP
1 0.019258 1.99011 0.008694 98.0012 0
2 0.03325 1.053039 0.406848 98.52333 0.016786
3 0.044309 0.69919 2.505067 96.72741 0.068334
4 0.053482 1.392133 7.250432 91.18823 0.169207
5 0.061758 2.425733 14.76367 82.45657 0.354035
6 0.069753 3.097296 24.14908 72.07173 0.681896
7 0.077731 3.237174 33.88556 61.65763 1.219639
8 0.085625 3.023587 42.54313 52.42091 2.012374
9 0.093124 2.683579 49.29707 44.95507 3.064281
10 0.099829 2.361572 53.96625 39.33229 4.339896
11 0.105407 2.118435 56.77343 35.333 5.775136
12 0.10968 1.966361 58.10827 32.63916 7.286207
13 0.112663 1.895532 58.39557 30.93433 8.774569
14 0.114538 1.887206 58.04438 29.93565 10.13276
15 0.115602 1.919042 57.4278 29.39635 11.2568
16 0.116195 1.968004 56.85947 29.10531 12.06721
17 0.116628 2.013565 56.55858 28.8946 12.53325
18 0.117121 2.041378 56.61839 28.65261 12.68763
19 0.117783 2.045818 57.0028 28.3317 12.61968
20 0.11861 2.029826 57.58254 27.94083 12.4468
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shed light on this paradox by examining different aspects of FDI. In particular, 
we do not consider the aggregated FDI level as a homogenous factor that may 
affect the host country’s economy. Instead, we break down the aggregated FDI 
level that a country receives into its major components: greenfield investment 
and cross-border M&As. We argue that, since greenfield investment and cross-
border M&As are distinct in their nature, they may have different impacts on the 
economy.
To this end, we examine the dynamic relationship between greenfield invest-
ments, cross-border M&A, domestic investment and economic growth in Vietnam 
over the period from 2003 to 2017. The empirical results show that, while green-
field investments complement domestic investment, which subsequently leads to 
higher economic growth, cross-border M&As exert a significant crowd-out effect 
and thus hamper the economy over both the short- and long-term.
Overall, our study emphasises the importance to policy makers and academic 
researchers in making a closer inspection on the economic implications of differ-
ent components of FDI. Considering FDI as a homogenous factor when assess-
ing its economic implications may be erroneous and could subsequently lead to 
Table 6  Variance decomposition of M&A
This table represents the percentage of the forecast error variance of M&A, as explained by the other 
variables over 20 periods
Period S.E. M&A Greenfield 
investments
Domestic investment GDP
1 0.542288 100 0 0 0
2 0.735512 99.20965 0.20523 0.000943 0.584179
3 0.790951 97.42794 0.361191 0.185373 2.025493
4 0.805978 94.98802 0.348896 1.013603 3.64948
5 0.817786 92.27378 0.544073 2.509137 4.673006
6 0.830586 89.65849 1.149957 4.183125 5.008428
7 0.84179 87.49306 1.910341 5.609863 4.986733
8 0.849881 85.97111 2.477879 6.65594 4.895066
9 0.854888 85.0603 2.718012 7.367113 4.854572
10 0.857764 84.5653 2.733815 7.830466 4.870421
11 0.859778 84.23385 2.74909 8.114693 4.902364
12 0.862043 83.84557 2.977613 8.26437 4.912444
13 0.865241 83.26736 3.534373 8.311158 4.887104
14 0.869542 82.47174 4.406009 8.283368 4.838883
15 0.874676 81.52017 5.475472 8.20917 4.795188
16 0.880099 80.52359 6.578231 8.114988 4.783194
17 0.885204 79.59836 7.560825 8.022329 4.818483
18 0.889492 78.83291 8.320796 7.945473 4.90082
19 0.892688 78.27112 8.821583 7.890964 5.016335
20 0.894772 77.91116 9.08671 7.85867 5.143465
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inappropriate policy implications. As greenfield investment seems to indicate a 
more beneficial FDI entry mode rather than M&A in Vietnam, there is a need for 
the Vietnamese government to provide policy incentives to attract more greenfield 
investment. Moreover, as these positive effects might be distributed unequally 
among the economic sectors in Vietnam, there is a need from the government 
to improve infrastructure and governance (Vu et  al. 2008), in order to support 
the less-developed economic sectors, such as the transportation and construction 
sectors, through further encouragement of inward Greenfields investments flow. 
Meanwhile, since cross-border M&A appears to exhibit a detrimental effect on 
domestic investment, and subsequently on economic growth, policies which aim 
to reduce the crowding-out impact of M&A could be desirable. More restrictions 
may also be imposed on foreign investors to lessen their huge M&A flow into 
some sectors in which domestic firms have either limited comparative advantages 
or even none at all, especially in the manufacturing industry (Le 2010).
Table 7  Variance decomposition of greenfield investments
This table represents the percentage of the forecast error variance of Greenfield Investments, as explained 
by the other variables over 20 periods
Period S.E. M&A Greenfield 
investments
Domestic investments GDP
1 0.1551 5.77161 94.22839 0 0
2 0.298503 3.415835 95.50084 0.206405 0.876919
3 0.432933 2.093783 94.73177 0.503344 2.671101
4 0.549966 1.403016 92.88527 0.743317 4.9684
5 0.645757 1.047308 90.54677 0.885007 7.520911
6 0.719671 0.862419 88.0226 0.941339 10.17365
7 0.773305 0.773356 85.474 0.944286 12.80836
8 0.809677 0.747924 83.01806 0.924261 15.30975
9 0.832583 0.768511 80.77749 0.901288 17.55271
10 0.84608 0.819518 78.88723 0.884116 19.40913
11 0.853999 0.883982 77.46944 0.873599 20.77298
12 0.85951 0.945123 76.59212 0.867408 21.59535
13 0.864797 0.99 76.23491 0.863891 21.9112
14 0.870933 1.012692 76.28596 0.863798 21.83754
15 0.878012 1.01494 76.57635 0.86975 21.53896
16 0.885465 1.003921 76.93366 0.88449 21.17793
17 0.892474 0.988639 77.22728 0.909253 20.87482
18 0.898319 0.976734 77.3891 0.943031 20.69113
19 0.902603 0.97271 77.41071 0.982755 20.63382
20 0.905322 0.977562 77.32666 1.02407 20.67171
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Fig. 3  Response of M&A and greenfield investments to a shock to GDP and domestic investment
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Appendix: Robustness test: alternative order of variables
In this robustness test, we assume that economic growth is the most exogenous 
variable in the model and that it is likely to impact on the other variables. This is 
because the economic condition in a certain country could affect the investment 
incentives of investors directly, both domestic and overseas. Previous researches also 
contend that domestic investment may impact on the investment incentive of foreign 
investors, as it can serve as an indication of how thriving and competitive the market 
is. Therefore, it follows GDP and is placed in the second row of the matrix.
Arguably, foreign investors consider the cost–benefit trade-off associated with 
various aspects of host countries’ social-economic environments when making their 
penetration strategies. Since both the economic condition and domestic investment 
level are parts of the host country’s overall economic environment, it is reasona-
ble to assume that both M&A and greenfield investment will be influenced by the 
host country’s GDP and investment level. Following the literature, we assume that 
M&A could affect greenfield investments. This assumption is based on the proposi-
tion of Calderón et al. (2004) that higher M&As are followed by higher greenfield 
investments. Thus, M&A is placed in the third row of the matrix, whereas greenfield 
investment is placed in the last row. To this end, our matrix is specified as follows:
The empirical results are reported in Fig. 3. Overall, the results are predominantly in 
line with the baseline results reported earlier.4
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎣
1 0 0 0
a21 1 0 0
a31 a32 1 0
a41 a42 a43 1
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎦
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎣
휇
GDP
t
휇
Domestic Investments
t
휇
MA
t
휇
Greenfield Investments
t
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎦
=
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎣
b11 0 0 0
0 b22 0 0
0 0 b33 0
0 0 0 b44
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎦
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎣
휀
GDP
t
휀
Domestic Investments
t
휀
MA
t
휀
Greenfield Investments
t
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎦
4 A series of specification tests, including the stationary test, co-integration test, and lag length selection 
are also conducted to ensure a well-specified model. Our model passes all of these tests.
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